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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis effort is an attempt to establish the
relationship between the traditional cultural and business
practices of a foreign country with the U.S. military pro-
curement policies and regulations. It is not intended to
provide a check list for U.S. contracting officials doing
business in a foreign country. Rather it is intended as a
warning to these officials that they must have an under-
standing of the history and cultural heritage of the country
in order for their business relationships to be successful.
They mU5t nave an appreciation o±. new uisy are being
perceived by the foreign businessman to make sure that they
are not [inadvertently alienating him.
What the author hopes that the reader will gain from
this thesis is an appreciation of the existing problems in
this subject area. Too long the image of the "Ugly American'
has dominated our foreign dealings. We are considered in-
sensitive to the hopes, desires and aspirations of others,
not taking the time or the trouble to learn other languages,
traditions, social customs or mores. The U.S. military
plays an important role in our relationships with foreign
countries. Overseas procurement in support of U.S.
8

military forces is vital to the economy of many of the
countries in which these forces are stationed.
The U.S. contracting official is an important link in
this effort for he is one of the few officials that has
direct daily face-to-face dealings with the foreign business
community. Through his example and by his efforts, the
business community receives an image of the United States.
This thesis centers on U.S. military procurement policy
in Japan. It presents in an encapsulated form the major
cultural traditions and business practices of that country
and then takes the reader through a true case — the dollar
crisis and subsequent yen revaluation of 1971. The author
will attempt to demonstrate that with more indepth knowledge
of the country, the problems created during the crisis could
have been recognized and thereby minimized earlier, without
having any impact on the business relationships between
the two countries.

II. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
The U.S. military is effectively running out of money.
Gone are the days when defense budgets sailed through Con-
gress with all flags flying from the yardarnu Today the
military budget is faced with Congressional critics intent
on cutting as much as possible and shifting the funds to
other programs. The economic problems of inflation and
staggering cost increases in effective complicated weapons
systems have had a direct impact on defense allocations
particularly in the research and development area.
This decrease in funds has led the U.S. Defense estab-
lishment to cooperate more fully with other friendly nations
in the use of foreign technology in weapons system acqui-
sition. For example Army Regulation 70-41, which became
effective 1 March 1974, requires that the Army remain
"abreast of doctrinal and material research and develop-
ment in friendly foreign nations." This information will
be used in "influencing, planning, and executing Army
research and development programs."
This policy recognizes that no longer can the U.S.
afford to spend millions repeating research and develop-
ment that has already been accomplished and available to
10

the U.S. The advantage is not only in dollars saved, but
often in the availability of weapons systems years earlier
2
than would otherwise be the case. The policy contained
in the Nixon Doctrine seeks to promote an increase in the
share of the burden of defense assumed by our allies and
therefore an increased utilization of foreign technology.
The Defense Department has many projects under development
or in production implementing this policy. To cite a few
examples being considered for use by the U.S. Navy include:
Harrier Aircraft — United Kingdom; Lynx Helicopter —
France; VAK - 191 V/STOL — Germany; WM 22 Fire Control
System — Netherlands; Penguin MKl — Norway; Seasparrow —
NATO; 76MM/62 Compact Gun Mount — Italy; Gabriel — Isreal
The utilization of foreign technology in U.S. weapons
systems has been and remains a highly controversial sub-
ject. It would involve a quantum jump in the existing
foreign purchases under the military procurement regu-
lations above that now done in support of the U.S. forces
stationed overseas. Not only would this cause a serious
economic problem in the balance of payments program but
also a shift in this country's protectionist trade policies
U.S. military procurement regulations contain policies
meant to exclude foreign competition in military purchases.
11

The Buy American Act passed in 1933 required that mandatory
preference be given to domestic goods in government supply
and construction contracts. In general the act prohibits
federal agencies from purchasing raw materials or manu-
factured articles from foreign sources for use within the
U.S., unless the head of the procuring agency determines
that domestic procurement is inconsistant with the public
interest, that the domestic cost is unreasonable, that
domestic materials or products are not available in
sufficient quantities or that they are not of sufficient
quality. In 1962 the Department of Defense directed that
the services would add on a 50 percent differential to
the price of foreign bids or proposals which has all but
. . 3
eliminated foreign competition.
The problems of buying foreign hardware, real or
perceived, which have motivated the Buy American protection-
ism include: (1) a possibly dangerous reduction of the
industrial mobilization base; (2) decrease in "Design
American" capability; (3) a balance of payments problem;
(4) possible dependence on foreign sources for certain
essential components, maintenance, and spare parts; (5)
a reduction in potential American employment; (6)
Americanization costs which include: metric conversion,
language translation, drawing recasting, redesigning and
12

modifying to meet U.S. quality, reliability and safety
standards; (7) strong Congressional and nationalistic
pressure to "Buy American."
The international trade policies have started being
liberalized over the past few years and this trend appears
to be continuing. This means that the U.S. military will
be involved more and more in foreign procurements either
directly or through licensing agreements between foreign
and U.S. industrial firms. There can be no doubt that
business in the U.S. is atypical to business as generally
conducted in most any other nation in the world. Compe-
tition as known in the U.S. has never been accepted
4
elsewhere. Business interests in the U.S. generally
regard government controls as hostile. In contrast,
throughout the world, even where governments are not
engaged directly in business, they have exercised controls
over their respective economies to a far greater extent
than that witnessed in the U.S. There can be no doubt
that all governments are guided by their own objectives
and interests and, therefore, all governments discriminate
in their procurement policies and practices in favor of
the products of the domestic manufacturer.
In the world of today it is obvious that the lowest
bid is not automatically accepted. The following criteria
13

are applied in particular instances as "the most interest-
ing tender" in Belgium; "the lowest suitable tender if
circumstances permit" in Austria; "the most economical
bid" in Germany; the "most advantageous to the state when
all circumstances are considered" in Sweden; and "the
contract will be awarded to that responsible offerer
whose offer conforming to the solicitation will be most
advantageous to the government, price, and other factors
5
considered" in the United States. In short, every nation
has its machinery for discriminating in favor of products
of domestic origin.
An obvious problem in drafting and negotiating
foreign contracts is the diversity of language with the
difficulty of attaining the desired precision so that no
conflict arises in the translated versions of the contract.
This diversity of language is compounded by the difference
in the understanding of legal principles and differences
in well-defined words and phrases of one nation as opposed
to another.
The U.S. legal tradition is rooted in the common law
system while the majority of nations function under the
civil law system which encompasses codified federal legis-
lation as supplemented by various acts of the legislature.
Because of this different approach to law there may
14

result a divergent abstract understanding of legal principles
which may go to the essence of the contract being negotiated.
For example the concept of contract consideration, i.e.,
something of value given or done in exchange for something
of value given or done by another in order to make a binding
6
contract, is unknown in the civil law system.
In addition to differences in business practices and
legal concepts all nations have their own traditional
cultural heritage. These traditions must be understood in
negotiating with foreign businessmen to achieve any success-
ful relationship.
These are but a few of the specific problems related
to foreign procurement. The procurement official must recog-
nize that the human race is divided by barriers of culture.
In this contemporary age of interdependence, almost no one
is insulated from massive cross-cultural interaction. The
principal problem of foreign procurement is to learn how to
conduct relations between culturally distinctive groups,
and to demolish these barriers through interaction and
communication to gain perception and understanding of other
viewpoints.
Foreign procurement for weapons systems technology
or in support of U.S. forces overseas presents unique
15

challenges for the U.S. military contracting officer. Not
only must he understand the philosophy and policies of his
own country but he must be aware of the policies of the
other country as well. For how he meets this challenge




III. DESIGN OF THE INVESTIGATION
A. USE OF JAPAN AS THE BASIC MODEL
The Orient has always held a certain fascination to
Westerners. Articles, books, movies and other media have
always used the term "mysterious" in describing Asia and
its peoples. The U.S. has always played a dominent role
in the trade and politics of the Orient. In fact the
Pacific Ocean has been more an American "lake" policed
by the U.S. Navy. This interest has been primarily for
the promotion of trade rather than for colonization or
imperialism.
The cultures and traditions of Asia are thousands of
years old but the growth of Japan into a world economic
power has only taken a little over a hundred years. Some
authors predict that the 21st Century will be dominated by
Japan as its economy equals or surpasses the United States.
These predictions have caused great interest in Japan and
a quest for the reasons behind this success.
This thesis deals with the cultural interface in
foreign procurement and while it is true that any nation
could have been chosen as the model for this topic, Japan
stands out as the prime candidate. Japan is a homogeneous
nation having never really been successfully invaded by
17

other peoples, therefore, her cultural traditions have not
been markedly influenced by others. There is a keen sense
of national identity and separateness, in culture, language
and race. This is not true of other countries such as
Germany, Italy or France.
Also, because of the tremendous interest in Japan,
there are numerous excellent reference materials and books
on the culture and business practices of Japan. In fact
the author found that the abundance of material created a
problem in choosing which authors to select and use as a
basis for this thesis.
The case introduced later in this thesis was chosen
because it emphasizes the problems of cultural interaction
and communication between two distinct cultures. It contains
specific examples of the cultural traditions described in
the literature on Japan. Here one can readily see the
clash between differing viewpoints of legal interpretations,
business practices and policies, and cultural heritage.
Although communication was being carried on there was no
common understanding of the interpretations of the dialogue
and its effect on alleviating the problems. Each side
fell back within its rigid mold of cultural background
relying on this to somehow solve the problem. Hopefully
the case demonstrates how easily twenty years of mutual
18

trust and successful business relationships could have been
destroyed by failing to understand that all people do not
think like we do.
The author also chose this case because of the personal
experience of having lived through the dollar crisis of
1971 as the senior Navy procurement representative in
Japan. The research material used in this case was provided
from the official U.S. Navy files of the Naval Supply Depot,
Yokosuka, Japan. The author gratefully acknowledges the
assistance of that activity in providing all of the original
documents for this thesis effort.
To outline the author's experience in the area of
military procurement in Japan, the following list of job
titles with dates is included here for authenticity:
1. Assistant to Director, Purchase Department, Naval
Supply Depot, Yokosuka, Japan, June 1970 - April 1971;
Director, Purchase Department, May 1971 - July 1972.
2. Alternate Navy Member, Japan Procurement Coordinating
Board, June 1970 - April 1971; Navy Member, May 1971 - July
1972.
3. Alternate Navy Member, Japan Contract Conciliation





A. BRIEF CULTURAL HISTORY OF JAPAN
The Japanese people, whose history as a nation and
whose culture are almost 2,000 years old, have mastered and
used the material aspects of European and American modern
life more successfully than any other people in Asia.
After a long period of isolation from foreign influences,
their rulers deliberately entered, only a century ago, into
adaptive and imitative competition with the West, which led
to great economic power, to conquest by war and finally to
crushing defeat. It was only a little more than a quarter
of a century ago that Japan lay in ruins, its dreams of an
empire in Asia shattered, its economy smashed, its cities
in ashes, and its population stunned by the total defeat of
World War II.
However, reconstruction was swift and recovery so rapid
that by the middle 1950 's, Japan was poised for the economic
takeoff that transformed it into the world's third most
productive economic power, after the United States and the
Soviet Union. In fact Japan's long-term growth rate of 10
to 14 percent a year has been so phenomenal that economists
predict that the country could come close to rivaling U.S.
living standards by the end of this century.
20

Many factors have contributed to this success story.
Japan is a remarkably homogeneous nation; its people are
well educated and have an almost unlimited capacity for
work and self-discipline; its industrialists and financiers
combine caution and imagination in a way that stimulates the
economy and produces spectacular results; its government is
stable; its defense expenditures are minimal, as Japan relies
on the umbrella of U.S. military might. As a result of
these combinations of favorable circumstances, Japan has
plunged into an age of unprecedented prosperity and progress.
At the same time, Japan is a land of delicate beauty
and highly stylized cultural forms that lend its landscape
and people a charm and serenity that sometimes seems at
odds with the country's headlong rush into the world of
mass consumer production, traffic jams, pollution and
computerized technology.
The turning point in the history of modern Japan begins
with the "Meiji Restoration" in 1967. For more than 200
years prior to this, Japan had remained a closed country,
ruled by military governors called Shoguns, who had reduced
the emperor to a mere figurehead. Under the Tokugawa Shogun
Japan was stagnating under a feudal system which divided
society into four distinct castes: warriors or samurai,
farmers, artisans and tradesmen, in that order. This
21

system was so powerfully instilled that it exercised control
over the very lives of the people to the extent of prescrib-
ing exact rules on all activities relating to daily life and
behavior
.
The defeat of the Shogun and the restoration of the
Meiji Emperor, Mitsuhito, and his forward looking advisors
opened Japan not only to Western ideas and commerce but to
all the forces of international politics of the nineteenth
century. The young samurai "changed their Japanese dress
for top hats and dark suits and sailed off to America and
Europe to study Western techniques of government, industry
3
and war." Ey the turn of the century, the process of
modernization was far advanced and by 1920 Japan was a
world power.
Modernization and industrialization brought far-reaching
social changes but without sacrificing Japan's traditional
culture. The government sought not only to preserve, but
to elaborate and emphasize the values of unquestioning
obedience to superiors, absolute loyalty to the emperor
and his representatives and self-sacrifice.
Even the first Japanese constitution given by the
emperor to the people in 1889 was built on hierarchy. It
gave the people a place in the state and established the
Diet but the "writers took every possible precaution to
22

guard against popular interference and the invasion of public
. . 4
opinion." This was done m a conscience effort to maintain
and foster the national well-being. The advantages of ob-
serving "proper station" were to be maintained in the modern
5
world. This sole authority was also used in the field of
industrial development. The leaders planned, built and
financed with government funds, the industries they decided
they needed. A state bureaucracy was then organized to run
them. Foreign technicans were imported and Japanese managers
were sent abroad to study the industry. Once the industry
was thriving the government sold it to a chosen financial
oligarchy. These became the controlling combines or zaibatsu,
6
chiefly the Mitsui and Mitsubishi families. It was felt
that industrial development was just too important to be
entrusted to the laws of supply and demand or to free enter-
prise. Japan decided from the beginning that instead of
starting industrialization by the production of consumer
goods and light industry, she would start with heavy in-
dustry. Industries such as arsenals, shipyards, ironworks
and railroads had priority and were brought to a high stage
of technical efficiency. Light industry and small manu-
facturing flourished in the country operating with minimum
capitalization and maximum utilization of cheap labor.




In all areas the Japanese order their world with con-
stant reference to hierarchy. In the family and in personal
relations, age, generation, sex and class dictate proper
behavior. In government, industry, religion and the
military, areas are carefully separated into hierarchies
where neither the higher or lower may overstep their prerog-
atives without penalty. This division has never been
questioned in Japan because it is felt to be legitimate.
Many blame the exportation of this concept on Japan's entry
into World War II. For example, the preamble to the
Tripartite Treaty with Germany and Italy reads: "the govern-
ments cf Japan, Germany and Italy consider it as a condition
precedent to any lasting peace that all nations of the world
7be given each its proper station. . . " The declaration of
war handed to Secretary Hull as Pearl Harbor was being at-
tacked repeated the point: "It is the inimitable policy
of the Japanese government to enable each nation to find
its proper place in the world. The Japanese government
cannot tolerate the perpetuation of the present situation
since it runs directly counter to Japan's fundamental poli-




The defeat of Japan in 1945 resulted in its loss of
all its overseas holdings and in the occupation of the
24

home islands by the United States forces representing the
Allied powers. Under the Occupation an ambitious program
of social, political and economic reform was launched to
lay the foundation of a democratic and peaceful order. A
new constitution guaranteed civil liberties and established a
parlimentary system of government responsive to the elec-
torate. In an important innovation the constitution forever
renounced the right of the nation to make war or to use the
threat of force in international disputes or to maintain any
armed forces. The control of the zaibatsu was taken away
from the control of the leading families. Legal measures were
taken to remove old social inequalities, grant rights to labor
movements and initiate land reform and economic reconstruction,
Financed for the most part by American aid the economic
miracle since World War II is known to all. The country
enjoys material prosperity and experiences the difficulties
of trying to live by new standards when old and frequently
contradictory ones have-not yet disappeared.
What are some of the cultural traits that the Japanese
have clung to throughout their history? The most prevading
is hierarchy which has been discussed. Another of the most
important is the Japanese capacity for purposive, dedicated
and communal action. The remarkable feat of the Japanese
in carrying out their modernization plan in the early 20th
25

century was the first really successful example of industrial-
ization by a non-European country. In part this success and
the remarkable recovery following World War II was due to an
increasing flexibility and willingness to experiment. One
of the outstanding features of the "Japanese mind" through-
out history has been its persistent inquisitiveness and flexi-
bility in the face of new and demonstrably superior intel-
9lectual systems. The Japanese have somehow managed to accept
quite readily the entire range of thought currents from the
West which have resulted in a distinctly Japanese adaptation.
The Japanese have always admired good craftmanship and have
been able to master almost any technology available to
them. In nearly all activities and issues the Japanese
traditionally think of themselves as members of a group and
their satisfactions are largely expected to come through
group fulfillment of group objectives. In traditional
Japanese culture and even today one of the "worst of all
sins is to display an egoistic disregard of, disinterest
in, or resistance to group mores, attitudes, taboos, totems,
traditions or objectives — or often just to display any
individualism at all."
The Japanese are intensely loyal and faithful. The
basis for this is bushido or "way of the warrior" which
12
was the code of the samurai. It is similar to vows of
26

chivalry in the Western world. The foundation for bushido
is the laying down of one's life for one's lord or complete
13loyalty. Connected with bushido is kokutai translated as
"national polity" or "national essence." Kokutai includes
the concepts of national structure, particularly the
emperor system; national basis, the myth of the divine
origin of Japan; and national character, the special moral
virtues in individual behavior and social cohesion embodied
in bushido. Kokutai was used by the militarists during
World War II to rally the people to the cause of Japan and
14its date with history. It has been used after the war to
rally the people to the task of economic development and
reconstruction.
Some other traits of the Japanese character are their
feeling of shame, guilt and ridicule. The Japanese are
taught to feel shame before society and to fear it. The
result is a self-consciousness which borders on an inferi-
ority complex. They avoid shame by preserving "face" and
self-respect much as an American would feel from his indi-
15
vidual conscience. Guilt is closely related to the sense
of social shame and is derived from the system of loyalties
which cements the structure of their traditional society.
One of the most effective punishments for a Japanese is
ridicule. To be ridiculed is to lose one's precious
27

dignity and self-respect or to "lose face." Behind the
seemingly over-politeness of the Japanese is the lurking
16
fear of ridicule and ostracism. It is these traditions
that force the Prime Minister to go on television and accept
responsibility and guilt for some national disaster or in
the past years under bushido for military or government
officials to commit harakiri or suicide.
One last important characteristic of the Japanese
people is the tremendous interest in foreign opinion about
Japan and the Japanese. Any visitor to Japan is asked this
question repeatedly during his stay: What do you think
about Japan? This also expresses itself in their keen
interest in what Americans are buying and taking back from
the country. Japanese feel that they as a country and as
17
a people are being judged and that they are "on stage."
This characteristic was demonstrated during the Olympics and
Osaka Exposition when the government built elaborate facil-
ities to present their nation in a better light to foreigners
The Japanese are highly sensitive about the cultural aspects
they export from flower arranging to judo to postage stamps.
The Japanese do not care whether or not it is possible for
other countries to adopt their institutions and their tech-
niques. Since they consider themselves unique, it would not
surprise them if their techniques were so special that they
28

could not be exported. It is important to them that the
unique Japanese be admired and respected and given status
18
in the eyes of the world.
B. CAUSES OF POSTWAR BOOM
Much has already been said of the rapid recovery and
economic growth of Japan. There are many reasons under-
lying this growth and any analysis must start with the
causes and effects of the actions taken by the Americans
during the Occupation that laid the framework for the
recovery. The primary objective of the Occupation was to
demilitarize Japan and install American style democratic
institutions. One of the first acts was the dissolving of
the entrenched zaibatsu system and sweeping personnel purge
of wartime leaders in the business community. This was
closely followed by the passage of the Anti-Monopoly Act
to breakup the huge conglomerates as the U.S. tried to dictate
and install its own traditional business mechanisms on the
Japanese.
The removal of the top family business executives
brought about the emergence of a new business leadership
in Japan. The change in corporate structure led to a wide
diffusion of corporate ownership and resulted in the sep-
aration of ownership and management. The real control in
the leading industries passed to professional managers who
29

19had come up from the ranks. These were comparatively
young men, most of them in their forties who had been serv-
ing in the upper-middle level of management in such functions
as department heads, plant managers, and division heads. It
is estimated that over 3600 key executives in Japan's
leading corporations and 56 members of the zaibatsu families
were purged causing a crucial leadership gap in the large
20
companies. The new leaders rose to the challenges and
provided strong and gifted leadership in the postwar era.
This new leadership was able to take advantage of many
factors that led to the economic growth. The following
21list gives causes for this success:
1. An abundant and increasingly well educated work
force . Cheap labor was available because of the extremely
depressed postwar state of living and the migration from
rural to urban areas. This work force was easily adaptable
to the industrial process due to its high literacy and ex-




High labor motivation and employment loyalty . The
sense of self-discipline, in part traditional, in part
stimulated by the postwar spirit of self-denial, as well
as intense motivation and loyalty to employing companies
made, for high performance and group cohesion.
30

3. High personal savings . This tradition gave Japanese
banks a strong economic position and provided funds for
capital investment. The Japanese savings rate is approxi-
mately 20 per cent versus 6 to 13 per cent in most other
22
major countries.
4. Social stability . The political leadership has
remained stable. Also there has been an absence of major
or sustained labor strife.
5. Constructive role of government . The government
adopted a protective and highly cooperative relationship
with the business community. Such key government organs
as the Finance Ministry and the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry assumed an overall guiding role defining,
more through consultation than through centralized direction,
basic choices and priorities, and emphasizing long range
planning.
6. Corporate cooperation . Though the Japanese cartels
were broken up, the tradition of cooperative arrangements
was not uprooted. This cooperation permitted an effective
division of effort and allocation of resources.
7. Heavy equipment investment . In replacing the
bombed out factories the Japanese centered on procuring
the newest and most efficient equipment available.
31

8. Banking structure . Japanese banks played a key role
in financing enterprises, in balancing the flow of capital,
and in forestalling major business failures.
9. Stiff exchange controls . These provided the Japanese
economy with a shield against speculation, protected the yen
and the development of promising industries, and avoided the
outflow of needed Japanese capital and the internal take-over
of Japanese industries by foreign interests.
10. The low value of the yen . The official rate of
exchange set at 360 yen to $1 U.S. provided Japanese exports
with a competitive advantage in the world market.
11. Availability of foreign technology . The Japanese
were able to exploit the free trade situation to undertake
a broad program of importing and adapting to its needs ad-
vanced foreign technology, and by buying up patents and
23licenses from everywhere. Thus they avoided the high
cost of indigenous research, development and experimentation.
12. Raw materials . The global postwar development boom
opened to the Japanese broad opportunities for access to raw
materials.
13. Low defense expenditures . Under the umbrella of
U.S. military protection, Japanese industry was able to
concentrate its resources in areas offering the greatest
competitive payoff. Both the Korean and Vietnam wars
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stimulated urgent American purchases in Japan and the rapid
development of an industrial sector of tactical and strategic
importance to the American war effort.
Certainly the above list is not all inclusive. By
Western standards, these business structures and practices
in Japan are considered strange and could not be used in
most other industrial nations effectively.
C. BUSINESS PRACTICES IN JAPAN
A corporation to a Westerner is an impersonal organi-
zation for which he works and from which he receives income.
The employer is free to fire the man if he thinks it neces-
sary while the employee is free to find a better job. A
Japanese company, in marked contrast, is a family. The man
who goes to work for a Japanese company does not "get a
job," he "enters the company" and pledges it a lifetime of
24
service. " The company undertakes to look after the well-
being of the employee for the length of his career. Con-
sequently, one of the most agonizing decisions a young
college graduate has to make is his choice of a company,
25
as it is in a very real form an act of marriage.
Once in a company the employee is steered into a
planned career development in which he is promoted by
seniority up through the middle reaches of the company,
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where merit begins to take over. At the very top levels ex-
ecutives sometimes change from one company to another.
Usually this is within a group of associated companies or
for staffing the top echelons of a new venture.
Despite the security of the lifetime employment system,
a Japanese businessman or laborer works hard. He is motivated
not by money but mostly by a sense of loyalty and obligation
to the company — the same sense of duty he feels to his
family and country. Obligations are ingrained in the
Japanese ethic, and the employee's performance is more for
the good of the company than for himself.
This paternalistic management approach has been criti-
cized by Westerners as inefficient and self-defeating. How-
ever, this approach has taken the natural industriousness
of the individual Japanese and combined it with the cultural
tradition of communal and group participation to set new
records of productivity. Any visitor to a Japanese factory
at the beginning of the day listening to the employees sing-
ing the company song and doing callisthenics together can
quickly comprehend the feeling of unity and purposefulness
that pervades the plant.
This paternalism has also accounted for the lack of a
strong labor movement in Japan as compared to the U.S. and
some European countries. Most unions are company unions
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which feel little need for a struggle with management, since
the goals of both are the same. As the economy has prospered
labor has negotiated for higher wages and benefits which are
worked out together with management. Strikes of more than
a few hours long are rare, and a prolonged labor dispute al-
most unheard of.
Another odd practice in the eyes of the Westerner is
the process of decision-making in Japan. The Japanese em-
i
27
ploy a "diffuse, group-centered decision-making apparatus."
In this process the views of all parties who have an interest
in the decision are canvassed, and an attempt is made to
accommodate each of these views. Direct confrontations are
avoided whenever possible, and many institutional mechanisms,
including the use of middlemen, are employed to prevent them.
A dissident party may also be placated by granting him a
concession on some issue totally unrelated to the decision
28
at hand. One of the difficulties that exists is in deter-
mining who is the effective decision-maker, since decisions
are made by all interested parties, each of whom has veto
power. A virtue of the Japanese system is that the effort
to keep all parties satisfied practically eliminates the
29
"demoralizing squeaky-wheel phenomenon." If some party
or group still remains opposed to a given initiative, the
result is usually a non-decision, i.e., a decision to stall
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and keep the question circulating indefinitely until the
matter is either dropped or a change in conditions permits
unanimous agreement. A result of this process is a thorough
discussion of the issues by all who are affected and an
equally thorough educational process. This provides all
the alternatives and complete staff work prior to the de-
cision so that once made its implementation is smooth and
rapid.
A business practice of particular interest to this
thesis is the Japanese view of contracts and contractual
disputes. People of different cultures have very different
attitudes toward written agreements or contracts. In very
few cultures are contracts taken as seriously as in the
United States. The Japanese are quite casual about written
documents. Kahn, Halloran and George describe this char-
acteristic Japanese attitude as follows:
"Where Americans in cases of dispute tend to say,
'Let us return to the document on which the relation-
ship is based and see what it said, ' many Japanese
would not think the matter of sufficient importance
to be mentioned. For mpst Japanese the critical
issue is the present and past emotional background
of a relationship, the personal issues and attributes
that led to its creation, and the current power or
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bargaining situation. The Japanese would want to
know: what was the ambience of the situation in
which the document was signed; what events have
occurred since the signing and what are the current
relationships of the concerned parties? — all things
that are usually irrelevant to an American involved
30
in a dispute over a 'contractual issue.
"Japanese businessmen avoid precedent and depre-
cate legal, contractual obligations because they
believe an agreement valid only so long as the con-
ditions under which it was reached continue to hold
true. They view contracts with suspicion and draw
them up with an eye to flexibility in contrast to
the American practice of trying to close every
conceivable loophole. Few disputes between Japanese
businesses ever go to court because this would be an
admission that they have not been able to negotiate
a compromise. Courts operate on the same theory and
endeavor to mediate a compromise if a dispute comes
to them in desperation. Courts are deliberately
slow, not only because care is required but because
the longer a court holds off, the better the chance
31
the two parties will be forced to compromise."
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"A Westerner entering into a contract with a
Japanese individual or firm will find that a contract
is often considered an agreement to enter into a gen-
eral course of conduct rather than something fixing
the precise terms of performance. As a result there
may be basic disagreement over whether or not the
32
agreement has been breached..."
Much of the same attitude shown above with regard to
business relationships also holds for treaties and other
international agreements and understandings. If there is
a change in power or other relationships but new emotional
relationships have not been built up, then no treaty is
likely to have serious moral binding effect on the
33
Japanese.
One of the most powerful business practices in Japan
is the cooperation between the government and the business
sector. Japanese companies compete fiercely for market
shares but they do cooperate with each other and with the
government in ways that would make U.S. antitrusters bristle,
Companies accept "administrative guidance" from the powerful
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) on every-
thing from mergers and the formation of cartels to imports
34
of technology. Commercial banks also get guidance in
their operations from the Bank of Japan. In return they
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borrow heavily from the central bank. Standing behind the
Bank of Japan is the Ministry of Finance perhaps the single
most influential agency in economic policy making. This
ministry appoints and has supervisory authority over the
central bank, thus controlling monetary and fiscal policy
35in the government. Another important government bureau
is the Economic Planning Agency, whose director is a cabinet
member. This agency is responsible for accumulating facts,
analyses and projections, and for publishing general
36
economic objectives.
MITI has long had direct relationships with business.
No major decision is taken by an industry without MITI '
s
37
cognizance. Japan's antitrust laws are anemic and non-
existent if MITI approves a cartel, a price-fixing arrange-
ment or production quotas. Much of MITI ' s day-to-day
influence is felt through the trade associations to which
the companies belong. Major investment and mergers are
subject to MITI approval.
This interaction between the government, finance and
business sectors of Japan has led to the nickname "Japan,
Inc." As implied by the phrase there is the basic assump-
tion that the objectives of government and business are
the same: the maintenance of Japan's economic health and
the promotion of the nation's interests. "'Japan, Inc.'
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is a special kind of corporation: a conglomerate in U.S.
terms. A conglomerate can channel cash flows from low-
growth to high-growth areas and apply the debt capacity of
safe, mature businesses to capitalize rapidly growing but
unstable ventures. It can move into a dynamic new industry
and bring to it financial power that no existing competitor
can match. It can increase capacity quickly. The result
is that the conglomerate is in a position to dominate a
new industry by setting prices so low that existing com-
petitors cannot finance adequate growth. Its costs
are so low, compared with the competition's, that it can
sell at the going price and earn large profits. In all
these senses 'Japan, Inc.' is indeed a conglomerate, a
zaibatsu of zaibatsu. The Bank of Japan is the financial
center, and with the bank's help each rapidly growing
industry can incur more debt than it could on its own; the
borrowing power of the entire portfolio — Japan itself —
is available to each industry. Hence the economy as a whole
funds new enterprises, holds prices down, competes success-
38
fully in the world market and earns large profits."
D. EFFECTS OF U.S. PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS
!•• Armed Services Procurement Regulations
All purchases and contracts made with appropriated
funds by the U.S. military services must be made in
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accordance with the Armed Services Procurement Regulations
(ASPR) under the authority of Chapter 137, Title 10 of the
U.S. Code. These regulations provide detailed guidelines
for the preparation of the procurement request, solicitation
and evaluation of bids and proposals, award of the contract
and administration of the performance and acceptance of the
goods and services. The agent of the U.S. Government re-
sponsible for the proper interpretation and implementation
of these regulations is the contracting officer. In many
39
respects the contracting officer is a limited agent.
His authority to bind the U.S. is restricted to the limi-
tations of his appointment, the directives of his depart-
ment, the regulations of ASPR, the Federal statutes, inter-
pretative decisions and opinions and the Constitution.
The basic underlying premise of U.S. procurement policy
is competition. This powerful force operating in a free
enterprise system will effectively provide the required
product in a timely manner at the lowest cost to the govern-
ment, price and other factors considered. Thus, the preferred
method of government contracting is formal advertising which
requires adequate competition. Recognizing that the basic
ingredients for formal advertising may not be present in pro-
curement situations outside the U.S., all foreign contracting
(with the exception of some construction) is done by
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negotiation. This exception to the rules for formal adver-
tising applies to property and services to be procured and
used outside the U.S., its territories, possessions and
Puerto Rico. The ASPR states that when these conditions
are present "no other negotiating authority shall be used,
40
nor shall formal advertising be used."
The use of negotiation in foreign procurement allows
the contracting officer to explain the U.S. procurement
regulations, discuss and explain specifications, contract
terms, conditions and clauses with the contractor. It
also takes a burden off the contracting officer in deter-
mining whether true competition is present since he may
not be familiar with the foreign country's business
practices
.
In Japan the contractors for the most part had a
good working knowledge of ASPR and the normal standard
contract clauses required in the contractual document.
New contractors were provided with excerpts from ASPR
translated into their language to provide them with the
basic U.S. procurement principles. The area of most con-
cern was the accounting practices and disclosure of the
company's records to the U.S. audit agencies. To do
business with the U.S. military the Japanese contractor
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was required to adopt many U.S. accounting standards and
the company proposals were subject to audit and review for
cost or price analysis before, during and after contract
performance.
2. . Status of Forces Agreement
The use of Japanese contractors to supply goods
and services to the U.S. military stationed in Japan was
recognized and specifically agreed upon in the government
to government agreements. Under the Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) it was agreed that "the United States may
contract for any supplies or construction work to be
furnished or undertaken in Japan for purposes of, or
authorized by, this Agreement, without restriction as to
choice of supplier or person who does the construction
work. Such supplies or construction work may, upon agree-
ment between the appropriate authorities of the two Govern-
41
ments, also be procured through the Government of Japan."
It was further agreed that "the United States armed forces
will furnish the Japanese authorities with appropriate
information as far in advance as practicable on anticipated
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major changes in their procurement program in Japan."
Naturally the Japanese government was quite interested
in the U.S. contracting as much as possible in Japan. The




MITI provided the contracting officers with lists of sources
for various products or services and was able to establish
industries that would meet the military's recurring needs.
Although MITI never tried to influence a contract award,
copies of all contracts over $5,000 were provided to this
agency monthly so they could see what types of materials
were being bought as well as the volume of procurement
dollars being spent in Japan. These procedures applied to
non-appropriated fund activities such as clubs and exchanges
as well.
The largest military contract in Japan was with the
Japanese Government to provide Japanese civil service
employees to the U.S. This Master Labor Contract set the
wage rates, fringe benefits, promotion and classification
criteria as well as disciplinary procedures for all the
workers on U.S. military installations. This assured that
the loyalty and allegiance of the Japanese worker remained
with the Japanese government.
3 . Competition
As stated earlier the basis of U.S. procurement
policy is competition. It does not take a contracting
officer in Japan long to perceive that this is not true in
Japan. The Japanese, a deliberate people, are reluctant to
leave anything to chance, and regulate the economy to bring
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all its components into harmony. They intensely dislike
competition. The Japanese are personally competitive for
power and prestige but fear that if this is not controlled,
what they consider excessive competition will cause economic
chaos. Japan has limited space for agriculture and industry,
limited resources, and limited capital. The margins for error
are small, and the Japanese believe that laissez-faire, un-
coordinated dec is ion-making, and the play of market forces
43
are luxuries they cannot afford.
The Japanese realize that U.S. procurement regu-
lations require the appearance of competition and most
solicitations for products will receive numerous bidders.
However, the low bid will normally be from the contractor
who has held the contract since the Occupation. One has
the feeling that the pie has already been cut up and the
wedges distributed equally to all the interested parties.
For example, a review of contracts for fresh produce might
reveal that contractor A has been supplying the Naval base
at Yokosuka for the last 20 years, while contractor B and
C have been supplying the Naval Air Facility, Atsugi and
the Naval activities at Yokohoma their produce for the
same period of time. Both contractor B and C will bid
every year on the Yokosuka contract but they are never
low nor will they reduce their price during negotiation.
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The same will be true for the Atsugi contract. Contractors
A and C will bid but contractor B will always come in with
the lowest price.
To foster competition the contracting officers
have tried various methods. For example, one method used
in ship repair is to break the tasks down to small com-
ponents and then try to get competition among a large firm's
subcontractors. The results of this procedure have resulted
in the growth and expansion of many of the subcontractors
into at least medium-size firms built by American competition.
However, when the large firm decides it wants a particular
job all the other bidders will drop out immediately.
This non-competitive climate makes the job of the
contracting officer much more difficult. The ASPR requires
strict rules and procedures for stringent cost or price
analysis and indepth audits for non-competitive procure-
ments. It must be stressed however, that Japanese contractors
do not take monetary advantage of the lack of competition to
make windfall profits or resort to overpricing. In most all
cases the low bids are found after close scrutiny to be fair
and reasonable.
4 . Contractual Disputes
ASPR provides for various routes for adjudication
of contractual disputes. Prior to any dispute being taken
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directly into the court system, the procurement regulations
outline various administrative procedures to settle claims
and disputes. These channels basically ensure that the
contractor may receive a quick and fair hearing and resolution
of the dispute.
There are two basic channels provided the con-
tractor for settlement of litigation. One is through the dis-
putes clause of the contract for matters that relate to prob-
lems within the contractual structure itself. The other
channel is through the provisions of Public Law 85-804 for
matters that relate to problems outside the scope of the con-
tract.
All Department of Defense contracts contain a dis-
putes clause. This clause states that any dispute concerning
a question of fact arising out of the contract which cannot
be negotiated amicably by the two parties shall be decided
44by the contracting officer. The contracting officer makes
a final decision in writing and sends it to the contractor.
The decision is final and conclusive unless the contractor
appeals the decision within 30 days to the Secretary of the
appropriate service. Appeals from contracting officer de-
cisions are heard by the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals (ASBCA) who render decisions which are binding on
the contractor and the government unless appealed to the
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courts on a question of law. This Board works for the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and hears cases from all three
military services. Pending the final decision on a dispute
the contractor is required to continue performance under the
contract in accordance with the contracting officer's final
decision.
In Japan the SOFA provided an additional adminis-
trative procedure between the contracting officer's decision
and the ASBCA. Recognizing that there could be problems and
difficulties arising out of differences between Japanese and
U.S. economic laws and business practices the SOFA provided
for a Contract Conciliation Panel. Specifically the treaty
stated "disputes arising out of contracts concerning the
procurement of materials, supplies, equipment, services and
labor by or for the U.S. armed forces, which are not resolved
by the parties to the contract concerned, may be submitted
to the Joint Committee for conciliation, provided that the
provisions of this paragraph shall not prejudice any right
which the parties to the contract may have to file a civil
45
suit. This Panel composed of the senior U.S. procurement
officials in Japan and an equal number of representatives of
the Government of Japan could hear contract disputes and try
to reach a negotiated settlement between the two parties.
It assured the Japanese contractor that he would have
48

representatives on the Panel that would be able to understand
and sympathize with his point of view. The decision of the
Panel was not binding and still could be appealed to the
ASBCA as the function of the Panel was that of a mediator,
and as such, was more to help reach an amicable compromise
than hand down a verdict.
The Conciliation Panel was quite active during the
Occupation and the Korean War until the contractors began
understanding the U.S. procurement rules and regulations.
It also took some time for the contractors to develop faith
and trust that the ASBCA decisions would be fair and impartial.
During the author's tour in Japan, only one case was brought
to the Conciliation Panel and this one was settled by out-
side negotiation before the hearing was concluded.
The other channel for relief outside the contract
under Public Law 85-804 is for extraordinary contractual
actions necessary to facilitate the National Defense. This
Act provides for contractual adjustments such as amendments
without consideration, correction of mistakes and the formal-
46ization of informal commitments. To hear cases for relief
under this Act a Contract Adjustment Board (CAB) has been
established within each military department. Under the Act
the CAB's are authorized to provide equitable relief to
contractors if and only if they decide that this relief
49

will facilitate the National Defense. Claims under this
procedure are few in number in comparison to the ASBCA be-
cause of the extraordinary nature of the statute and the
stringent requirements for documentation and evidence.
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V. A MODEL - THE DOLLAR CRISIS OF 1971
A. PREPARING FOR THE INEVITABLE
In July 1970 the procurement agencies of the three
services were satisfied with the results of negotiations
with the Japanese contractors for the FY 1971 annual con-
tracts. For the first time the contractors had raised the
question of contingencies for changes in the foreign ex-
change rate of the Japanese yen. At this time all contracts
written by the military services were expressed in U.S.
dollars but were paid in yen because of Japan's currency
control regulations. Each contract contained a Payments
Clause that read: "Payment under this contract shall be
made by Yen Check, based upon the official rate of exchange
current at the time of payment " (underlining added by author
for emphasis) . The official rate of exchange had been set
at 360 yen to $1 U.S. This rate had been stable since the
postwar administration of General MacArthur. The contractors
realized that if a yen revaluation took place they could be
subject to monetary losses on each contract, depending upon
the adjustment in the new official exchange rate.
During negotiations of the contracts the contractors
were advised that contingencies of this type could not be
allowed and the Defense Contract Audit Agency and local
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Procurement analysts had made every effort to identify and
eliminate contingency-based costs whenever they appeared in
the proposals. In most cases the contractors had been will-
ing to remove them based on assurances provided by U.S. con-
tracting officials that this matter was under study and that
policy direction from higher levels was being sought on this
problem.
At this time Japan was experiencing a phenomenal economic
growth rate. During the period 1966 through 1970 this rate
averaged 12.96 per cent. The Japanese trade surpluses were
mounting as exports increased. The Japanese balance of pay-
ments surplus had risen from $60 million in 1966 to $1900
2
million in 1970. At the same time the Government of Japan
was discouraging talk of a currency revaluation which would
take away the competitive advantage it enjoyed in the world
marketplace. In 1969 Japan was first in the world in the
production and manufacturing of shipbuilding, radio sets,
cameras, transistorized televisions, commercial motor ve-
hicles and motorcycles and was second to the U.S. in the pro-
duction of television sets, computers, cotton yarn, aluminum,
copper, crude steel, caustic soda, plastic resin and second
3
to the U.S.S.R. in the production of cement. During this
time the value of the U.S. dollar as the recognized unit of
world exchange was becoming unstable in the international money
market and there was talk of currency exchange rate realignments.
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It is interesting to note here that although Japan was
the third largest economic power in the world, the U.S.
military was not writing contracts in yen but rather in
dollars. At the same time the U.S. was writing contracts
in local currencies in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea
and South Vietnam. To the Japanese who feel that they must
take their proper place in the world hierarchy, this would
appear to have been a cultural "slap in the face." The
U.S. justification for this oversight was the convenience
of having the contracts expressed in U.S. dollars for the
U.S. customers, comptrollers and contracting officers.
The U.S. Navy had experienced problems with the exchange
rate from only one group of contractors. These were the
aircraft repair, overhaul and rework group consisting of
Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Shin
Meiwa Industry Company and Japan Aircraft Manufacturing
Company, all members or affiliates of the zaibatsu conglom-
erates with close ties to MITI. This group had submitted
proposals containing identical requests that stated:
"Though our quotation is based on the dollar amount, the
official rate of exchange shall remain the same as the cur-
rent rate as of June 1970 during the whole period of the
FY71 contract." During negotiations this issue was side-
stepped, but based on the importance of these contractors
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to the Vietnam war effort, the warning lights were flashing
that this matter should be resolved before the next negotia-
ations and the contract payment policy reviewed and changed
if possible. Not only did these four contractors represent
over $14 million per year in contracts or about half the
Navy procurement business in Japan, but the fact that com-
panies with close ties with MITI were asking for a change
was an early indication that the Government of Japan was
considering a possible yen revaluation.
At this early stage it should be noted that these firms
at the top of the hierarchy would have been the first ones
privy to any major economic policy shifts being considered
by the Government of Japan. These firms represented those
chosen few who would have to be protected from serious
economic losses.
Three months later on 29 September 1970 the U.S. Navy
received a petition from sixteen of the largest Navy con-
tractors requesting a revision to the existing contract pay-
4
ment clause. The group again was headed by the four air-
craft companies but this time also included two other
members of the zaibatsu in the shipbuilding industry;
Sumitomo Shipbuilding and Machinery Company and Sasebo Heavy
Industries Company. This petition was presented to the
Commanding Officer and the contracting officer of the Naval
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Supply Depot (NSD) , Yokosuka, Japan. The petition expressed
concern over the pressure from other countries for Japan to
revalue the yen upwards causing the contractors to suffer
losses under the U.S. dollar denominated contracts and re-
quested that the payments clause be changed to read that pay-
ment be based on the official rate of exchange current at the
effective date of the contract award (underlining added by
author for emphasis) rather than at the time of payment. This
petition was followed the next day by another petition on the
same subject from eleven industrial gas contractors doing
5business with the Navy. This group advised that the present
contract expired on 31 December 1970 and gave the first threat
of non-performance of the contract if the rate of exchange was
changed. Specifically it stated that: "We are afraid it may
be disturbe (sic) perfect contract performance." This pe-
tition further provided two other solutions to the payments
clause problem; (1) write the contracts in yen thereby nega-
ting the need for the payments clause or (2) amend or termin-
ate the contract if and when the yen was revalued. This
threat should have been viewed with respect to the Japanese
attitude toward contractual agreements. The intent is clear
that they were saying that if the yen is revalued the con-
ditions and intent of the parties at the time of signing the
contract would be drastically changed and therefore they had
the right to terminate the contractual relationship.
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In accordance with U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) Policy
Letter 11-14 of 29 April 1968 these petitions were accepted
by NSD and forwarded through official channels to USFJ to
the Government of Japan and no other action was taken by
military procurement or comptroller personnel. In retro-
spect these petitions were the first subtle evidence being
provided at an early date to alert procurement officials to
review current policy and consider remedial action.
The question must be raised at this time; was any plan-
ning or consideration being given to this problem? To
answer the question, one must briefly look at the U.S. pro-
curement regulations and authorities in Japan. Contrary to
popular belief the ASPR contains no guidance on the method
of payment of foreign procurements. ASPR regulates domestic
contracts almost entirely. The power to regulate payment
procedures is delegated to a Joint Procurement Coordinating
Board (JPCB) in each foreign country. This authority is
provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense through
the applicable unified command of the country involved.
The Japan JPCB was chaired by USFJ and included represen-
tatives from each of the services; normally the senior
procurement officer from each service. The Navy member
was the Director of Contracts, NSD Yokosuka, respresenting




The question of yen revaluation had been of interest to
the JPCB since May 1970 when a petition was presented by a
group of contractors to the U.S. Army Japan, Director of
Procurement, requesting a change in the contract payment
6 ,.
.
clause. During this time the first official warnings were
sent to the three services' higher headquarters citing a
7possible yen revaluation and requesting guidance. The pay-
ments clause in use at this time had been approved by the
JPCB in January 1969 at the request of the U.S. Army.
In the fall of 1970 the Navy made a motion in the JPCB
that the clause be changed to have the yen rate pegged at
360 yen to $1 U.S. in the clause. This motion was discussed
at several meetings and after consultation with the U.S.
Embassy the motion was tabled. On 12 November 1970 a new
policy guidance memo was issued by USFJ which stated that
the clause would remain unchanged but gave contracting
officers authorization to write a contract in yen if "it
p
was in the best interest of the U.S." It was unofficially
understood however, that prior approval of the JPCB would
be sought before the- contract was signed.
During the early part of 1971 the yen problem cooled
off. The contractors continued to request a change in the
payments clause, but willingly signed contracts containing
it. At the negotiation table the Japanese contractor would
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propose a yen contract but the U.S. would say that our
policy was to only issue dollar contracts and that if the
yen was revalued then the contractor "would be taken care
of." The U.S. official was intent on the contractor sign-
ing his name so that a binding contract was executed. The
Japanese businessman perceived the U.S. as understanding
his problem and viewpoint that he was only agreeing to the
contract based on no yen revaluation and that if this
changed then the contract would be void.
In March 1971, the yen problem started appearing as
front page news in the local press. On 6 March 1971, Prime
Minister Sato stated: "I am not thinking of revaluing the
9
yen or redenomination of the yen." He also noted that
Japan's gold and foreign currency reserves had reached $4.4
billion in January. On 26 March 1971 Mr. Sasaki, Governor
of the Bank of Japan, made the same statement and noted that
Japan's foreign reserves would reach $5.3 billion by the end
10
of March. The U.S. news media made the first widely pub-
licized statement on 29 March 1971 when Newsweek stated:
"The Japanese Government has repeatedly denied that it is
considering revaluation of the yen. But the country's
major trading companies, who quote their prices for imports
of iron ore, coking coal and other raw materials in foreign
currencies, are not convinced. So wary are the trading
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companies, in fact, that they have decided to ask Japan's
steelmakers and their other major industrial customers to
insure them against loss if and when the value of the yen
is increased."
On 3 April 1971 the Mainichi Daily News carried an
editorial stating that the yen revaluation issue has re-
cently "assumed an inkling of reality." A few days later
the same paper stated that the U.S. was not exerting
12pressure on Japan to revalue the yen. On 9 April 1971
the Government of Japan's position appeared to be cracking.
The Bank of Japan advised that it was considering lowering
the official discount rate by .25 per cent to slow the rise
of foreign reserves and it also revealed that the ship-
building industry had written 77 percent of its commercial
13
contracts in Japanese yen instead of the usual U.S. dollars.
Again it should be emphasized that it was the major industrial
firms with close governmental ties that were already hedging
against a currency revaluation.
The JPCB held an emergency meeting in early April 1971
when it was learned that NSD Subic Bay Philippines had written
a contract in Japan with Japan Aircraft Company changing the
payments clause by pegging the rate at 360 yen to $1 U.S.
This contract had been signed without the approval or know-
ledge of the JPCB or the Navy member. Within a few days
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Japanese contractors were calling on procurement officials
all over Japan demanding the same treatment in their con-
tracts. In retrospect this action by NSD Subic Bay, heavily
condemned at the time, was a blessing in disguise because it
forced the issue and was the vehicle used to implement
changes to the payment policies. It also forced higher
authority to realize for the first time that revaluation of
the yen was bigger than just a procurement problem. It would
affect Japanese civil service employees working for the U.S.,
clubs and exchanges, budget and accounting, inventory control,
and the U.S. military personnel living on the Japanese economy.
The JPCB requested that each service develop a position on
the subject and report back to USFJ in early May. At the
same time coordination with the U.S. Embassy would be made
by the JPCB. The Navy representative briefed COMNAVFORJ
on the problem and advised that NSD was calling a conference
of all interested commands and activities on 13 April 1971
to brief them on the potential impact on their mission.
The briefing was well attended and for the first time the
seriousness and full impact of a yen revaluation was dis-
cussed in detail. One example of the action taken based
on the briefing was the transferring of the non-appropriated
fund clubs and messes retirement reserves from dollar




Tokyo. The resulting Navy position that emerged was that
action must be taken to change the payment clause to fairly
compensate the contractors for the fair value of the goods
and services procured, and that the change should be made
before the annual contracts were due for signing on 1 July
1971. The Navy proposed that the payments clause be changed
to read that payment would be made at the official rate of
exchange at the time of contract award rather than at time
of contract payment.
The Navy wanted the clause changed while it could still
be done voluntarily without the appearance of the U.S. being
backed into a position of either changing the clause "or
else." This recognized in advance that once the exchange
rate changed the inflexibility of U.S. contract law would
take over and demand consideration for any changes in the
existing contracts. It would also avert any appearance of
the Japanese contractors being put in the position of losing
face over the issue.
At the May meeting of the JPCB, the Navy and Air Force
positions were basically the same; the payments clause
should be changed to protect the Japanese contractors, and
keep up the relationship of mutual trust that the contract-
ing officer enjoyed with their contractors. The Army
position was to defer action on the problem for the present
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and take action when and if revaluation came. The Army-
position can be better understood if one considers that at
this time the reversion of Okinawa was being planned. The
Army was the principal procurement authority on the island
at that time. Since Okinawa was under U.S. administration
the currency used throughout the country was the U.S. dollar
so that contracts were written in dollars and paid in
15dollars. Okinawa was due to revert to Japan on 15 May
1972 and the Army, backed by officials at the U.S. Embassy,
felt that any yen revaluation would be postponed by the
Government of Japan until after that date. If this was not
done, thousands of Okinawans would lose money on their
dollar checking and savings accounts held by the banks.
Officials of the Bank of Japan were quoted in the press as
saying that the reversion of Okinawa could be one possible
factor to be considered in Japan's decision whether or not
to revalue the yen upward.
The issue was further clouded by the debate raging in
the news media. Foreign sources were being quoted as say-
ing that a revaluation of the yen was necessary and was
only a matter of picking the right time for the change.
This pressure for a revaluation mounted as the monetary
crisis in Europe forced the revaluation and floating of
the German mark and Dutch guilder while the U.S. dollar
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declined to historic lows on the exchange markets in re-
lation to other currencies. The U.S. was seen as putting
pressure on Japan to revalue the yen as Japan's reserves
leaped to $6.3 billion in May 1971. U.S. State Department
sources denied these charges stating: "We have made no
official, or unofficial, formal or informal proposal" that
17Japan revalue its yen. Treasury Secretary John Connally
was quoted as saying that the yen was "somewhat undervalued"
but that this was "very different" from urging the Japanese
18
to increase the parity of their currency. On a trip to
Tokyo former Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman
stated: "Revaluation of the yen will be helpful to the
world monetary system" and "In my personal opinion yen re-
19
valuation is necessary." He denied however, that he
would recommend a yen revaluation to Prime Minister Sato.
Business Week magazine said that Japanese businessmen ex-
pect a nine per cent upward revaluation of the yen probably




During this period government and business leaders of
Japan were stating flatly that the monetary crisis could be
solved without a revaluation of the yen. Finance Minister
Fukuda stated that raising the par value of the Japanese
currency would "have some obvious demerits amounting to a
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21loss of national interest. Prime Minister Sato stated
22
that the yen parity would be maintained. The powerful
23
Keidanren strongly opposed any change in the value of
the yen — "feeling that if it is carried out now when the
24
economy is in a slump, it might touch off a panic at home."
The Keidanren recommended that the government take "drastic
measures to curb the sharp and steady rise in the nation's
25foreign exchange reserves." The Japan Shipbuilding In-
26
dustry Association came out strongly against revaluation
as did Mr. Sato the Director General of the Economic Plan-
27
ning Agency. Probably the strongest statement was attri-
buted to Finance Minister Fukuda that "There will never be




Based on Navy and Air Force insistance that these two
services would take unilateral action to change the pay-
ments clause in the upcoming FY72 annual contracts, the
Army agreed to the new change and the JPCB unanimously
recommended to USFJ that the contracts be written in terms
of yen starting 1 July 1971. USFJ concurred and issued a
classified message to all procurement activities advising
of the new policy but requiring that no contracts be
changed until that date and that contracts already under
negotiation in U.S. dollars be continued. After 1 July
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1971 these contracts could be amended to yen contracts only
for some form of consideration from the contractor. The
effect of this policy was to double the number of dollar
contracts that were to later cause so much trouble. Since
a major portion of the annual contracts are negotiated at
the beginning of the fiscal year, the immediate change to
full yen terms on these contracts would have minimized the
entire impact of the later revaluation. The classification
of the policy change until 1 July was not popular with the
Navy or the Air Force, but had been accepted by them as the
only way to get Army concurrence to the policy change.
Since most of the contracts required extensive negotiation
during June and only dollar terms could be discussed, the
new contracts effective on 1 July were locked into the old
dollar policy for another year. These contracts were ex-
pressed in dollars and contained the old payments clause.
COMNAVFORJ through NSD Yokosuka implemented the policy
to all Navy procurement activities. The small purchase area
was relatively simple to change since most procurements
were done under Blanket Purchase Agreements which could be
modified unilaterally by the U.S. Major contracts had to be
modified by receiving consideration. This was difficult in
that the contractors had been honest about taking out re-
valuation contingencies from their proposals so that to
have the contract written in yen terms, many lowered unit
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prices, thereby cutting into profit margins. Since the
estimate of the proposed revaluation was forecast to be
around 10 per cent, NSD was successful in negotiating a 6
per cent reduction in price on a few of the contracts for
a change to yen terms, thereby sharing on a 60/40 basis the
proposed loss to the contractor. The contractors appeared
willing at this time to at least discuss the principle of
consideration since the basic situation had still not
changed. Although it was offered to all of the contractors
as a hedge against a future currency fluctuation, few took
advantage of it since most still believed in the U.S.
assurances that they would never suffer substantial losses.
During August 1971 rumors were rife that revaluation
was imminent. Two events were responsible for this; (1)
on 15 August President Nixon removed the gold backing from
the U.S. dollar and (2) Japan's foreign reserves had risen
to $12 billion, a quadrupling since the first of the year.
The Chase Manhatten Bank on the Yokosuka Naval Base started
limiting to $50 the amount of currency that could be ex-
changed into yen per person per day. On the weekend of
21 August 1971 the rumors were so strong that people were
exchanging dollars off the base at a devalued rate and
several contractors called the NSD contracting officer
offering to reduce prices by 10 per cent for a conversion
of their contract to yen terms.
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Late in the evening of Friday, 28 August 1971, the
new Japanese Finance Minister, Mr. Mikio Mizuta, made the
announcement the world had long expected. The Japanese yen
was allowed to float and find its own exchange level against
the U.S. dollar. For U.S. procurement officials in Japan
the crisis had become real.
B. THE CURRENCY FLOAT
On Saturday morning, 29 August 1971, a conference was
held at USFJ headquarters to draft a message to the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for guidance on the var-
ious issues created by the yen float. It was also necessary
to adopt a formal U.S. military position for the Joint
29
Committee which would be meeting with representatives
of the Government of Japan the next day. Representatives
were present from all three service Unified Commands as well
as Commanding Officers of all major military activities in
Japan. The members of JPCB attended to answer questions
on the impact of the yen float on existing dollar contracts.
The chairman opened the discussion with a summary of
the Government of Japan's position that would be presented
the next day. The Japanese representative had already ex-
pressed his sorrow that Japan would not abide by the Treaty
agreements. The rate of exchange had been established at
360 yen to one dollar during negotiation in 1952 between
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the two governments prior to the execution of the Admin-
istrative Agreement under Article III of the Security-
Treaty. Specifically Article XXV paragraph 2b of this
agreement stated: "It is agreed that Japan will: (b)
Make available without cost to the United States, until the
effective date of any new arrangement reached as a result
of periodic re-examination, an amount of Japanese currency
equivalent to $155 million per annum for the purpose of
procurement by the United States of transportation and
other requisite services and supplies in Japan. The rate
of exchange at which yen payments will be credited shall be
the official par value, or that rate considered most favor-
able by the United States which on the day of payment is
available to any party, authorized by the Japanese Govern-
ment or used in any transaction with any party by the
Japanese Government or its agencies or by Japanese banks
authorized to deal in foreign exchange, and which, if
both countries have agreed par values with the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, is not prohibited by the Articles
of Agreement of the Fund." Article XIX of the SOFA stated;
"Payment in Japan by the United States armed forces and...
shall be effected in accordance with the Japanese Foreign
Exchange Control Law and regulations. In these trans-
actions the basic rate of exchange shall be used." USFJ
Policy Letter 170-2 of 25 April 1969 implemented these
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treaties and stated in paragraph 26 entitled; Restrictions
on Exchange, that: "Official exchange of U.S. dollars to
Japanese yen for U.S. authorized personnel will not be made
for fractions of a dollar. Exchange will be made at the
official U.S. Forces rate of exchange only. (Currently ¥360
= $1.00)
The Government of Japan was going to request that the
Agreements be put aside and that the Bank of Japan would no
longer provide yen at the official rate of exchange to U.S.
Disbursing Officers and U.S. Military Banking Facilities
but would furnish yen at the "majority rate" or the rate at
which the largest volume of dollars was transacted the pre-
ceding day. A discussion ensued as to whether the official
rate of exchange was still 360 yen to $1 or was the official
rate the floating rate? A recommendation was made that the
U.S. insist that for official transactions such as govern-
ment contracts and salaries for Japanese civil service
employees the Government of Japan provide Disbursing Officers
with 360 rate yen and floating rate yen for all other trans-
actions. This recommendation was dropped after a long
debate. The final consensus was to accept the floating




A message was drafted to OSD explaining the problem
and outlining the impact of the floating rate particularly
on the U.S. military families living on the Japanese economy
paying rent, utilities and food costs in yen. It asked OSD
and the State Department whether to accept the Government
of Japan's position and accept the floating yen rate in view
of the government to government agreements. The message
also asked OSD for a ruling on the rate to be paid Japanese
contractors whose contracts called for payment in yen at
the official rate of exchange.
It was agreed that until OSD provided an answer to
these questions, all yen exchange would be halted on all
U.S. military installations and that no contractor's in-
voices would be paid by any Disbursing Officer or Fiscal
Officer. Military personnel who needed yen would have to
utilize commercial banking facilities in the city or town
near the base.
On Sunday the Joint Committee met with the represen-
tatives of the Government of Japan and approved the tem-
porary measures for yen/dollar conversion at the majority
30
rate. The Government of Japan also furnished copies of
its official message to the International Monetary Fund
stating that: "while the present parity of yen remains
unchanged and the Japanese authorities continue to intervene
T>

on the market, dealings in foreign exchange will, with
effect August 28, 1971, not necessarily be confined within
31
the margins around par hitherto observed."
On 30 August 1971 OSD provided guidance, agreeing to
the majority rate for all yen transactions and stating that
contracts written in dollars and payable in yen at the
official rate of exchange should be paid at the floating
rate current on the day of payment. Thus procurement
officials had their marching orders and could now provide
the contractors with definative answers on the outstanding
contracts.
ACTIONS TO PREVENT CATASTROPHE
One of the basic tenants of U.S. Government procure-
ment is that the Government is willing to pay a fair price
for quality products delivered within a specified delivery
period. The fair price includes providing the contractor
with a reasonable profit return on the cost risk he assumed
in undertaking the contract terms and conditions. Procure-
ment courses and training schools emphasize that the Govern-
ment will not tolerate a contracting officer knowingly
placing a contractor in a position of losing money on a
contract. Yet by the actions of the sovereign governments
of Japan and the United States in the turbulent monetary
crisis of 1971 the Japanese contractor appeared to be about
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to suffer substantial losses on his contracts with no clear-
cut remedy in sight. Clearly the conditions present when the
contract was signed had been significantly altered. In the
eyes of the Japanese these contractual agreements were no
longer valid or binding. One can sympathize with the con-
tractor who is locked into providing the U.S. military with
goods and services at a set dollar price that has just been
devalued by 15 percent while at the same time paying the
same amount of yen for materials and labor. What are the
options of the contractor? From the U.S. point of view he
could: (1) continue honoring the contract, hoping to make
up losses on the new annual contract by raising prices;
(2) walk away from the contract and just quit delivery
until the U.S. reformed the contract; (3) cut the quality
of the product thereby limiting losses; or (4) seek relief
from either the Japanese Government through some form of
subsidy program or the U.S. through the administrative dis-
putes clauses within the contract.
The problem facing the U.S. procurement officials in
Japan during the first week in September 1971 was to fore-
cast which options the contractors would choose. During
prior debates at the JPCB the remark was made many times;
"Don't worry about the contractors; when the German mark
was revalued no contractor there lost money." This
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optimistic assurance had been passed on unofficially to
the Japanese contractors in good faith, leading to the con-
clusion, perhaps naive, that the U.S. would take care of them.
Now the realization was becoming clear to the U.S. procure-
ment officials that maybe this wasn't going to happen.
These assurances, in which the contractors had put so much
trust and faith, might come home to haunt the contracting
officers. If higher authority dictated that the procure-
ment regulations were to be followed to the letter, then
there was no possibility for compromise to avoid a direct
confrontation. What if the contractors stopped delivery?
What were the legal remedies in this situation that could
be exercised? The U.S. Government couldn't go to, say, a
Federal District Court and get an injunction to force the
contractor to perform. Not even the contracting legal
advisors could advise if the Japanese court system would
take jurisdiction over the matter.
The first step taken by the Navy was to analyze the
outstanding dollar contracts affected by the revaluation.
NSD Yokosuka had 43 dollar contracts outstanding for a
variety of goods and services. The only other major Naval
activities holding dollar contracts were the Public Works
Center Yokosuka, mostly in the construction area, and NSD
Subic holding the vital aircraft repair and overhaul contracts.
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A briefing was given to COMNAVFORJ to outline the crit-
ical contracts in terms of sustaining the U.S. military mis-
sion in Japan. It was felt that the aircraft companies would
continue to perform but were the most likely to submit claims
under the disputes clause. On most of the other contracts
the goods could be brought in from the U.S. if necessary and
the services could be provided by an augmentation of forces
and skills to carry them out. Of most concern were the long
list of pilot and tug contracts caught in the revaluation.
If these contractors refused to honor the contracts, most of
the major ports in Japan would be closed to Military Sealift
Command ships, commercial tankers, and in some cases the war-
ships. Without logistical support by sea, especially fuel,
the military bases in Japan would be hardpressed to keep
operating for very long. At the end of the meeting, the
first priority was to ensure that these pilots stayed on the
job. The next priority was to gain time, for with every
month that passed another group of dollar contracts expired
and new yen contracts were negotiated to replace them. No
thought was given to the fact that the loyalty and trust of
the contractors might ensure continued performance. Certain-
ly the U.S. wanted to salvage what it could from the long-
standing good business relationships but no U.S. company
under the same conditions would continue to perform so why
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would a Japanese company? The situation had now become like
a war game with the contractors playing the role of the ad-
versary and a strategy had to be developed to checkmate any
of his moves.
Let us look first at the pilot and harbor services
contracts for it takes some understanding of the background
to understand the problems of arriving at a satisfactory
solution. Each port in Japan has a Pilots Association that
is licensed by the Japanese Government. The rates and fees
for all services are set each year for each port by the
32Japanese Diet. These rates are published by each port
and are expressed naturally in yen. Each year when the sole
source U.S. contract solicitation was sent out, the appli-
cable Pilot Association would submit the published rates as
set forth by Japanese law. The contract negotiator would
take these yen rates, divide them by 360 and place the rates
in the contract at the dollar figure. These contracts con-
tained option clauses that continued the contract from year
to year without re-negotiation of the terms except for the
legal rates. Of course as long as the yen rate remained
unchanged there were no problems; in fact, these were looked
on as the easiest contracts to complete each year. With the
change in the yen rate the lawyers raised the hypothetical
question that if the U.S. paid less than the rate set by
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legislation, was the U.S. breaking Japanese law and con-
versely, if the pilots accepted less than the yen rate were
they breaking Japanese law?
Contracting officers had been advised that they could
reform dollar contracts if they received consideration, but
in this case any consideration would place the rate under the
published price. A message was drafted by NSD Yokosuka to
the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) asking for one
time authority to reform this one contract type without con-
sideration to bring the rates in line with the published fig-
ures. NAVSUP replied that this request could not be granted
since reformation authority for contracts was vested only in
the Secretary of the Navy under extraordinary relief pro-
Visions of Public Law 85-8.04. NAVSUP suggested that some
form of consideration be negotiated so that the contracts
could be legally changed to yen terms. This policy decision
followed another of the basic tenets of U.S. procurement
regulations; that no U.S. contracting officer may give up
any of the U.S. Government rights under a contract without
receiving something of equal value in return.
On the remaining contracts the Navy issued a letter
to all its contractors stating that the matter was being
studied and that at the present time the only way a dollar
contract could be changed to yen terms was for the contractor
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to give up some form of consideration. It further praised the
contractors for their loyalty to the U.S. Navy over the many
years and held out the hope that some claims remedy would be
agreed upon that could provide some form of relief to the con-
tractors. In the interim it pleaded with them to continue to
perform under the terms and conditions of the written con-
tract. This letter appealed to the Japanese cultural heritage
more than was realized at the time. It appealed to the sense
of loyalty and dismissed the doctrine of consideration as not
applying fairly in this case and held out the hope of some
remedy that would completely reform the contract without the
contractor giving up anything.
A hasty meeting of the JPCB was called to set some for-
mal policy for the three services to follow so that there
would only be one face to the Japanese contractors. Each
service presented a report on the outstanding balance of
dollar contracts. In the aggregate there were 1300 of them
with an estimated unexpended balance of $41,630,000. Using
an arbitrary 10 per cent revaluation figure, the potential
loss to the contractors would be $4,163,000. It was felt by
the members that this figure was insignificant compared to
the loss of goodwill of the Japanese contractors and quite
small in comparison to the annual Defense Department expen-
33ditures in Japan of approximately half a billion dollars.
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It became quickly evident that the members of the
JPCB were personally sympathetic to the plight of the con-
tractors. Whether or not this was based on a sense of
equity or the specter of non-performance will probably
never be known. It was felt that legally under the terms
of the contracts that had been signed, there was no way to
provide relief to the contractors and that they would lose
any cases taken through the disputes clause to the ASBCA.
This followed the traditional U.S. doctrine of relying
solely on the written word of the contract and not on the
intentions of the parties at the time of the agreement.
There was a grey issue to many since the payments clause
of the contract stated that yen would be paid at the
"official rate of exchange." The Japanese press at this
time was carrying frequent statements by the Government
of Japan that the official IMF parity rate was still 360
yen to $1. However, this argument was not thought to have
merit in view of directives from service comptrollers to





The JPCB viewed with alarm the Navy problem with the
Pilot Associations and the equally serious problem of the
Army with land transportation contracts. It was felt that
some remedy other than consideration must be sought and
7

sought quickly to ensure continued performance under all the
contracts. The vehicle studied was Public Law 85-804 which
provides authority for granting relief to contractors in cer-
tain extraordinary situations. The law empowers the President
to permit the agencies concerned with national defense (Secre-
tary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air
Force) to modify contracts without regard to other provisions
of law concerning the making, performance, amendment, or modi-
fication of contracts. One of the types of relief under the
law is making amendments without consideration or in reality,
reformation of the contract. A finding that the national
defense will be facilitated by an amendment without consider-
ation can be made whenever an actual or threatened loss on a
contract, however caused, will impair the productive ability
of a contractor whose continued operation is essential to
the national defense. In this case the loss was caused by
actions taken by the U.S. as a sovereign and not as a con-
tracting party and therefore relief in these cases depends
on the equity or fairness doctrine.
The JPCB was well aware of the time-consuming process
required to submit claims for relief under this statute.
In view of this the idea was advanced that since the esti-
mated volume of claims would be so great that authority
should be requested from OSD through CINCPAC for a delegation
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of authority below the secretarial level to consider and
approve or deny contractors requests for contract amend-
ments without consideration where revaluation had reduced
the amount of yen payable to the Japanese contractor. A
message was drafted and concurred in by the component
35
commanders in Japan and coordinated with the U.S. Embassy.
The message assured that each case would be decided on its
own merits applying the doctrine of equity and fairness.
Each service would provide legal counsel to the board dur-
ing the hearings. The message recommended that the authority
be delegated to the senior procurement officer of each
service and that since these officers were also members of
the JPCB this would ensure that the authority would be at a
high enough level to ensure uniformity of action. The JPCB
requested that CINCPAC advise OSD of this request on a
priority basis. The reply advised that claims under
Public Law 85-804 were to be submitted in the normal manner
up through service channels for hearing and decision. In
retrospect the basis for this message was shaky. It was
naturally assumed that like a U.S. business all the Japanese
contractors would submit claims for relief. Based on the
Japanese tradition of group action, one contractor would
have been chosen to represent all the contractors and sub-
mit one claim. Then, depending on the outcome the group
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would have decided on the next course of action. The
possibility of ridicule was too strong for all of the con-
tractors to have opted for a direct confrontation with the
contracting officers in this area.
So by the end of September 1971 the situation looked
grim for both sides. The yen was quoted at 332 to $1 or
36
an 8 per cent revaluation. The policy received from
higher authority was to make amendments to contracts only
for adequate consideration and to assist any contractor
who felt justified to submit claims against the U.S. Govern-
ment via Public Law 85-804 or the ASBCA via the disputes
clause. A further upward revaluation of the yen was pre-
dicted with newspaper accounts stating that major firms
were using a 315 yen rate for medium and long term export
contracts with the period of payment exceeding three or
37four months.
NSD Yokosuka began receiving letters from the con-
tractors holding dollar contracts immediately after the
revaluation. The common theme in all the letters was the
request for the contracting officer to either change the
contract to yen terms or pay the invoices at 360 yen to $1
U.S. Appendix A and B are samples of the letters received
from the pilot and tug service contractors. As shown most
of these were short, polite, and to the point; please
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change the contract to yen to agree with the published
rates. The inference from these is that this problem
was one the U.S. created and therefore it was only reason-
able that the U.S. take unilateral action to avoid losses
to the contractors. It is also interesting to note that
of this group only one contractor, Hachinohe Kowan Unso
K.K., alluded to ceasing performance. Appendices C through
E are a few samples from other Navy contractors. The White
Cross Company's argument was typical of many of the com-
plaints; the cost of labor calculated for the contract is
set and must be paid in yen so losses would result if
performance continues. Their solution was for a fair
sharing of the loss with the U.S. on a 50/50 basis.
The letter from Denki Kogyo Company best illustrates
many of the points of all the letters: (1) we "requested
that the payment conversion clause should have been modi-
fied"; (2) our proposal "did not include any contingency
fee for a possible revaluation of yen"; (3) we "are aware
of our responsibilities to the U.S. Navy"; (4) we signed
the contract "in the expectation that you would make an
equitable adjustment for us if the rate is actually
changed"; (5) "the official rate of exchange ... remains
360 yen to 1 dollar"; and (6) "application of a floating




In answer to these letters the three services agreed on
a "form" reply. This answer stated that the U.S. contract-
ing officers were thoroughly aware and concerned with the
problems resulting from the Government of Japan's decision
to float the yen (underlining added by author for emphasis)
.
It assured the contractor that this complex matter was being
carefully studied to determine what courses of action were
open within the limits of the contracting officer's au-
thority and that when resolved the contractors would be
informed. The reply contained a pat on the back for the
loyal years of service and the amicable relationship en-
joyed with the contractor. It ended with a subtle plea
to continue performance by stating; "Your many courtesies
are greatly appreciated by this command and it is hoped
that effective business relationships will continue."
This was known in procurement circles as the "Buy Time"
letter.
The letter did indeed buy time but no satisfactory
solution to the problem was found except that as each
month went by more dollar contracts expired and went away.
So far the contractors had continued to perform and the
U.S. ordering activities were careful to hold to a minimum
the required services and material under the old contracts.
The yen rate had fallen to approximately 335 to $1 on
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1 October 1971 with the Bank of Japan actively control-
ling the rate of descent by buying and selling on the for-
eign exchange market. The argument still proposed by the
contractors was that the official rate of exchange still
remained at 360 yen to $1 U.S. and this is what they should
be paid under the written terms of their contracts.
In early November the Navy found a vehicle which was
thought would get a ruling on this argument and with the
interest and backing of the JPCB attempted to use a new
route to higher authority for clarification of this point.
The Ship Repair Facility (SRF) Yokosuka forwarded to NSD
Yokosuka a letter from a contractor claiming reimbursement
of 12,130 yen ($33.69) on a small purchase order. The
contractor, Daiichi Kansei Sangyo Company, had delivered
a priority shipment of liquid nitrogen to SRF on 15 June
1971 as scheduled and had submitted his invoice on the
same date. Through administrative error the invoice was
not processed to the Disbursing Officer for payment until
24 August 1971. The invoice was thus caught up in the
revaluation of 28 August and was paid at the floating rate
of 338.55 yen. Both SRF and NSD felt the contractor had a
valid claim since SRF readily admitted the clerical error
in taking so much time in processing the invoice. The




Washington, D.C. as a doubtful claim under the authority
of the Naval Comptroller Manual, Volume 4, paragraph 046369,
which requires that it be forwarded to the Genral Accounting
Office (GAO) for direct settlement. It was hoped that GAO
would rule on the question of the meaning of "official rate
of exchange." This ruling by a party outside the Defense
Department would then provide a precedent that could be
used in the larger cases. The results of the case were
long in coming and by the time of the decision events had
overtaken it, but GAO in disallowing the claim stated that
the official rate of exchange on the date of payment was
39
the majority rate.
Claims were coming in to the services now using dif-
ferent avenues as though the contractors had studied all
approaches available in the procurement regulations and
wanted to ensure that each path was covered. This rein-
forces the idea of group action which was being taken by
the Japanese contractors to find the best solution to the
problem. The situation or case with the best chance of
winning was put forth under each approach as a test case.
Twenty-seven contractors submitted a formal request that
their claims be heard by the Joint Committee through the
40Japan Contract Conciliation Panel. The Navy had two
41




Manufacturing Company, appealing the final decision of
the contracting officer under the disputes clause of the
contract to the Secretary of the Navy for a hearing before
the ASBCA. The Army also had an appeal from a final de-
cision of the contracting officer but along with the appeal
was a request for relief under Public Law 85-804. (This
case will be discussed in full in the next section)
.
On the international scene the finance ministers of
the ten major western countries agreed to meet in Washington,
D.C. on 17 and 18 December 1971 to solve the continuing mon-
etary crisis. The news media stated that the Government of
Japan felt that a revaluation of 15 per cent or more of the
yen would "plunge the economy into a deeper, prolonged re-
43
cession." By the 10th of December the yen had risen to
323 to the dollar and major trading firms were quoting
prices on the basis of 310 yen or the equivalent of a 16.13
44
per cent revaluation. The Japan Economic Research
Council urged the Japanese Government to set the rate at
320 yen with a 3 per cent margin up or down which would be
45
a 12.5 per cent revaluation. The day before the begin-
ning of the conference which was to be known commonly as
the Smithsonian Conference, Prime Minister Sato stated
that Japan would seek a revaluation of around 15 per cent
and would "never accept anything over 16.1 per cent
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(310 yen to $1) . To do this Japan would accede as much as
possible to demands for tariff cuts and import liberali-
zation and would promise to pick up a greater share of
46
U.S. defense costs."
Based on the resulting agreements reached at the Smith-
sonian Conference, the new official or par value for the
yen was pegged at 308 yen to $1 or an equivalent revaluation
of 16.88 per cent. The new rates could fluctuate by a mar-
gin of 2.25 percent.. Now that a new exchange rate had been
set, procurement officials could now calculate definitively
the contractors' losses. Their attention now focused on
the claims being processed and the impact of the decisions.
They had made it through December 1971 and so far no con-
tractor had refused to perform under the dollar contracts.
The Japanese contractors were proceeding on the basis of
trust and loyalty, while the U.S. procurement officials
were proceeding on the basis of law and regulations. The
confrontation which had been avoided so long now had to
come in the courts.
D. THE JUDGMENT
The yen revaluation problem was now in a new arena;
that of the courts. The resolution of the claims and
counterclaims can best be analyzed by following one case
from beginning to ultimate decision. The author has
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chosen the appeal of the Marubeni -I ida Company and Ohki
Construction Company, a Joint Venture, as the vehicle to
follow because this case was used by both the contractors
and the U.S. Government to decide the issue. As this case
moved through the administrative channels toward an im-
pending hearing, all other disputes, claims and appeals
were suspended pending the results of this one case. It
was quickly recognized that the contractors would be con-
tent with the decision since all of the legal arguments
as well as the equity claims were embodied in this one
case. Again, this case must have been chosen by the group
of Japanese contractors as the best case to put forward
on the "world stage."
This contract was entered into on 24 June 1970 between
the U.S. Army Engineer District, Far East, and the Joint
Venture to construct a transmitter facility at Chitose,
Japan. The contract called for payments of $853,707 pay-
able in four partial payments. The payments clause in the
contract stated that "Payment will be made in yen based
47
upon the official rate current at the time of payment."
Work was commenced and progressing as scheduled. Three
of the four partial payments had been made at 360 yen to
$1. The fourth payment came due in September 1971 after
the yen float and the contracting officer paid the invoice
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at the majority rate of 337 yen to $1. The contractor
protested the amount received, claiming that it should
have been based on 360 yen to one dollar and requested
an additional 7,031,100 yen. In support of the claim
the contractor enclosed a letter from an official of
the Bank of Tokyo stating that the "official rate of ex-
change between the Japanese yen and the United States
dollar remains 360 yen to one dollar" and that the float
only "constitutes an abandonment of the .75 per cent of
variance from the official rate which is allowed by the
48
IMF." It must be remembered that the Government of
Japan was still maintaining that the "official rate"
was still 360 yen to $1. However, OSD had ordered U.S.
officials to pay contracts at the floating rate based
on the Joint Committee agreement that the "official rate"
was now the majority rate. On 17 November 1971 the Army
contracting officer issued a final decision under the
disputes clause of the contract rejecting the contractor's
claim and notifying him of his right to appeal within 30
49
days. On 20 November 1971 the contractor notified the
contracting officer of his desire to appeal the decision
and to seek "appropriate equitable relief from the con-
sequence of the yen underpayment resulting from the
09

ambiguous wording of the payment provision of the afore-
50
mentioned contract." With this wording the contractor was
taking on the U.S. Government for all the Japanese contractors
holding dollar contracts. This was quickly recognized by the
Army and in their submission of the claim to the ASBCA noted
"that the appeal notice also claims equitable relief under
the provisions of ASPR Chapter XVII if legal relief is not
51granted by the ASBCA." This indeed was a precedent that
had never been tried before in settling a dispute. The con-
tractor was requesting an ASBCA hearing but if he lost the
case he concurrently was submitting a claim for equitable
relief under Public Law 85-804 for a hearing before the Army
Contract Adjustment Board (CAB) . Of course if the decision
of the ASBCA was favorable to the contractor the equity claim
would be withdrawn. It appeared to many on the U.S. side
that the contractor was acknowledging that he had a weak
case under the disputes clause and was in reality hoping for
relief from the CAB.
The Army requested that the case be given priority on
the docket since the decisions rendered would "govern pay-
ments to be made under numerous contracts executed" by the
three services in Japan. The JPCB and CINCPAC joined in
this request to OSD. In the separate portion of the sub-
mission under Public Law 85-804 the contracting officer
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recommended that the CAB grant relief and make the contractor
"whole, " in other words that he be entitled to not only lost
52
costs but profit too. The Army then submitted copies of
the complete files to the JPCB for comment.
As can be imagined the actions taken by the Army caused
much debate among the JPCB members. The Army contracting
officer had gone on record officially as being in favor of
equitable relief for a contractor holding a dollar contract.
As much as the members might personally sympathize with the
position of the contractors, the official position had been
not to give up any rights of the U.S. Government. The JPCB
• on 30 November 1971 asked each service to develop a position
on the policy of equity. It was felt that the JPCB must
continue to stand united and that the services could not
be allowed to go their separate ways on contract claims.
The basic Navy position was that each contract stands
on its own merit, that it would be improper for the Navy
to comment on a case to be decided by the Army CAB, and
premature to argue the ASPR 17 case until the ASBCA has
decided the appeal under the disputes clause of the contract.
The Navy felt that a remedy existed under ASPR 17 and that
contractors have every right to use it but the interpre-
53
tation was that only costs could be recovered not profit.
Navy legal counsel was more adament in his objections to what
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the Army had done. Counsel felt that the two remedies should
have been separated and decided in order. He also suggested
that the Joint Committee obtain a formal statement from the
Government of Japan that in fact the majority rate was the
recognized rate of exchange. This could be used to fight any
54
claim on the official rate of exchange argument.
The JPCB recommended to USFJ that the official policy
not sustain the actions of the Army contracting officer.
Public Law 85-804 states that a determination be made that
relief would facilitate the national defense. Based on the
evidence presented the facts in the case did not appear to
warrant such a determination. Further the position that the
contractors had been seriously hurt by the revaluation had
not been sustained. The contractors were still performing
their contracts and although a few claims had been submitted
the majority of the contractors had remained silent after
the first flurry of letters of protest right after the yen
float. Each case must stand on its own and it is up to the
contractor to prove that he has suffered severe losses and
55
not just a reduction of profit. This thinking did not
consider the Japanese cultural heritage at all. It was
based purely on U.S. experience with the profit motive.
If the contractors were really hurting, they would be put-
ting as much pressure as possible on the U.S. for relief.
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Since they were not doing this, they must have hidden con-
tingencies for a yen revaluation and therefore, were not in
as bad shape as had originally been thought. Many officials
started feeling that their sympathy for the Japanese con-
tractor had been misplaced and that the U.S. had been made
the fool. The idea that the Japanese contractor could be
suffering heavy losses and still continue to perform was
alien to their past experiences.
The JPCB recommended that the Army split the two claims
and that consideration be given to a request to hold the
ASBCA hearing in Tokyo which would facilitate the presence
56
of witnesses for both sides. The feeling of all the mem-
bers was that the ASBCA case would be won easily by the U.S.
The argument over the "official rate of exchange" was con-
sidered a weak one and without merit. This opinion was
reinforced at the Regional Procurement Conference spon-
sored by CINCPAC when an OSD representative stated that
the case would go for the U.S. The appeal under ASPR 17
was considered a grey area since the CAB ' s tried to be
as fair as possible in dealing with foreign contractors.
The ASBCA hearing #16937 was held on 7 January 1972
in Washington, D.C. No witnesses were called from the
JPCB or contracting agencies in Japan. The contractors
presented three basic arguments contending that:
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1. Under the Japanese Civil Code the parties are
bound by the exchange rate current at the time of contract-
ing, because the intent of the parties is payment computed
at that rate.
2. Articles XIX of the Agreed Minutes, to the Status
of Forces Agreement does not expressly authorize the con-
tracting officer to employ a contract provision providing
that the rate of exchange current at the time of payment
should control, but does state that the "basic rate of ex-
change, " which then had a value of 360 yen to the dollar
"shall be used.
"
3. That the official rate of exchange was in fact
360 yen to the dollar at the time (21 September 1971) of
the fourth partial payment.
The U.S. Government responded primarily to the third
argument. The response was that the "majority rate" (float-
ing rate) was the "official rate, " because it was established
by a Government of Japan — U.S. Joint Committee on 31
August 1971 and was specified as being for "official use."
The ASBCA rendered the following determinations and
57decisions on 6 April 1972:
1. It did not accept the first two contentions by
the contractor cited above and these were rejected.
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2. It did accept the third contention that the official
rate of exchange of 360 yen to $1 had remained unchanged by
the yen float and awarded the contractor an additional pay-
ment of 7,031,100 yen. The Board stated that the Joint Com-
mittee has no authority to set the official exchange rate for
the Government of Japan. Changing the rate is the right of
the sovereign power only and the official rate of exchange of
360 yen to the dollar was in effect at the time of the fourth
partial payment. The official rate of exchange was not
changed until 19 December 1971 at the Smithsonian Conference,
when Japan revised it to 308 yen to the dollar.
The ASBCA decision was announced in Japan on 22 April
ET Q
1972 and as expected caused considerable shock. This was
the case no one thought the U.S. could lose. The event also
demonstrated how well the informal communication chain was
working among the contractors. Many of the Navy contractors
holding dollar contracts came by the Purchase Office at NSD,
Yokosuka, to express their appreciation for the assistance
provided in helping them win the case. This was not spite-
ful but a genuine attempt to help us save "face" over losing
the case.
The JPCB held an emergency meeting to discuss the de-
cision, evaluate the impact and plan a coordinated course of
action to implement payments. The JPCB requested CINCPAC
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and OSD concurrence to start paying dollar contracts at the
"official" rate and settling claims on the expired contracts.
59
The estimated cost of these actions was $2.5 million. On
60
22 May 1972 OSD ordered all proposed payment action to cease.
The U.S. Government was filing an appeal of the ASBCA decision
and until the motion for reconsideration was heard, contracts
should continue to be paid at the majority rate.
The U.S. appeal was based mainly on the contention that
the Board had erred in its interpretation that "official rate"
meant the same as "basic rate." On 16 June 1972 the ASBCA
found no merit in any of the U.S. government arguments and
61
affirmed its original decision.
On 26 June 1972 OSD approved the payment to the con-
62
tractors at the official rates as set forth by the ASBCA.
The yen crisis was over and only the implementation of the
payment adjustments remained. Four days later on 30 June
all dollar contracts in Japan expired as the fiscal year




In retrospect the most important aspect of the dollar
crisis was not who won the case or why they won the case
but that the Japanese contractors continued to perform
under the contracts while absorbing substantial losses.
Certainly the threat was always there that performance
could cease at any time but a review of the cultural tra-
ditions of the Japanese would have shown that this pre-
cipitous action would have been "out of character."
Not only are the Japanese loyal and devoted to family
and employer but the contractors had always been intensely
faithful and honest in their dealings with their U.S. con-
tracting officer. The long years of dealing with the same
contractor for annual recurring requirements had established
a bond of mutual trust in this relationship. As long as
this trust was maintained the traits of self-discipline
and self-sacrifice surfaced precluding any abrupt termin-
ation of performance. Had the contracting officers not
shown at least a feeling of empathy for the contractor's
problem the result might have been different since this
would have caused the contractors to lose face.
There is also the aspect of group action and consensus
decision-making. Prior to the yen revaluation the petitions
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received by the three military services were signed by
groups of contractors doing a heavy volume of business with
that service. The contractors on the first Navy petition
ranged from large conglomerates to small interior decorating
shops in Yokosuka. Somehow this group of diverse businesses
was brought together in coordinated action to appeal to the
Navy to change the contract terms. After the revaluation
it was readily apparent that the contractors affected were
kept informed of all the actions going on to seek relief.
The continued performance under the contracts had to have
been approved by this group or association. Once this was
decided upon no one contractor would have faced the rebuke
of his peers by independently taking action against this
decision. If one contractor had quit they all would have
quit together. Another good example of the group behavior
trait was the move to drop all other contractual disputes
and let the Maribeni Case go forward as the test case. If
the decision in the ASBCA case had gone against the contractor
it is doubtful that any other contractors would have taken
any further appeal action.
One could well ask what role the Government of Japan
played during this drama. Certainly based on the close ties
between government and industry, the government was kept
fully informed of the actions being taken while giving the
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appearance of being aloof from the controversy. Again the
diverse groups presenting the first petitions had to have
been brought together and formed. It would certainly have
been easy for MITI to have arranged this since each service
was forwarding copies of their contracts to them on a reg-
ular basis. Once the yen revalued it would have been to
the advantage of the government for the contractors to con-
tinue performance. One can imagine the U.S. public reaction
if the pilots association had refused to handle ships from
Japan's closest ally. That peculiar sense of always being
on stage and being judged in the eyes of the world probably
prevented any moves that might have been considered hostile
or not in the national interest.
The Government of Japan had strongly resisted any re-
valuation that would hurt her competitive advantage in
world trade until the move was literally forced upon them
by the currency speculators when the gold backing was re-
moved from the U.S. dollar. The repeated assurances by
Japanese officials reported in the news media that re-
valuation was an extreme last resort had convinced the
Japanese people that the revaluation was being forced
upon their nation. The smaller contractors were a part
of this group while the large conglomerates with close
government ties were prepared for this contingency. On
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29 August 1971 the Mainichi Daily News reported that; "The
steel industry reacted rather calmly to the new currency
situation. Nippon Steel Corporation, Sumitomo Metal Indus-
tries, Ltd. and Nippon Kokan K.K., all major, steel producers
were not surprised at the floating of the yen because they
had been informed of it in advance by banking and trading
sources." This quote plus the advance actions taken by the
shipbuilding industry to hedge against the revaluation show
indeed that those industries at the top of the hierarchy
were favored with inside knowledge to protect them as much
as possible against economic losses.
Probably the most incomprehensible policies to the
Japanese contractors were the U.S. insistance on consider-
ation for contract modifications and reliance on formal
procurement regulations. How could the U.S. provide com-
plete oral assurances during negotiations that everything
would be taken care of if the yen revalued and then turn
around later and say that the written contract was the
only valid agreement? How could the U.S. knowing that the
contractor was losing money, ask for more money to change
the contract terms? It was these diverse concepts that
led both parties to the brink of destroying the solid
relationships built up over the years. To the Japanese
the conditions under which the contracts had been written
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had changed and changed drastically. To them there was no
question but that the U.S. should just provide them with
new yen contracts under the terms of the new situation.
They were willing to compromise as much as possible to
avoid a direct confrontation only to be told that under U.S.
policy there was no room for any negotiation or compromise.
To many of the contractors the ASBCA hearing was looked
upon as a play to provide them with an equitable resolution
of their problems but following all the U.S. rules of the
game.
This leads to the conclusion that to understand the
motivations of foreign contractors, one must have some
knowledge of their cultural heritage. The normal recom-
mendation to cure this deficiency is a school or training
course. This normal panacea in this situation would be
much too costly to establish and staff effectively. It
seems more appropriate that the importance of thorough
understanding of the cultural traits and business practices
of the foreign country to which a procurement official is
being assigned be stressed when the orders are issued.
A suggested bibliography of applicable references in this
area could be furnished with the orders. Any responsible
official going into a new situation should be able to rise
to this challenge and acquire a basic knowledge by self
101

study. The importance of the role of procurement officials
serving abroad as ambassadors to the foreign business com-
munity dominates the future of U.S. economic relationships.
The growing economic interdependency between nations is




TOKYO RISEN KABUSHIKI KAISHA
No. 2 11, Yamashita-Cho, Naka-Ku, Yokohama.
Yokohama Foreign Trade Bild.
Phone (681) 1723-5
Sep. 1st. '71
Messrs; COMMANDER MILITARY SEA LIFT FAR EAST
Gentlemen,
Payment in our contract, N 62649-70-D-0102 &
N 62649-71-D-0093, has been made in former official ex-
changing rate, which is $ 1 = Y 360. We always do all
our tug services in yen currency. Although in this con-
tract, dollar currency is adopted for your convenience,
tug boat rate of this contract is settled on the basis
of yen currency. Then, if floating exchanging rate or
decreased exchanging rate is adopted, that brings much
losses to us.
Therefore, we wish you to confirm that tug
boat rate in this contract shall be exchanged in former
official exchanging rate, which is $ 1 = ¥ 360, or to
amend tug boat rate in yen currency.
We shall very much appreciate to your kindly











U.S. Naval Supply Depot Yokosuka, Japan
Hachinohe Kowan Unso K. K.
3-7-2, Numadate, Hachinohe City,
Japan
Dear Sirs,
Coming into the early stage of fall season, it is our
pleasure to presume that you are in good health and at the
same time, we thank you very much for your constantly giving
us favorable considerations.
Re: Pilotage and tug service contract
rates
Regarding the subject contract, we have had a contract with
your Depot at your request and on behalf of individual
pilots, however, due to the Yen flotation against the Dollar,
we now find it difficult to continue performance of the con-
tract. The reason is, as you know, the pilotage and tug
service rates are all charged on an Yen basis and therefore,
the contract unit prices must be revised to express in Yen
figures or we may end up in breaching the contract and put-
ting in a claim through the Agent. Vouchers for two vessels
coving services performed in August are presently in our
hands. Please give us instructions as to how these claims













DATE 30 Aug 1971
To: Contracting Officer
US Naval Supply Depot, Yokosuka
From: Daiichi Kasei Sangyo Co., Ltd.
Contract: No. N62649-71-D-0097
Subject: Payment Clause of annual contract.
Dear Sir,
It is true that the present Yen and Dollar conversion
of rate is the most hard problems in our company. We
understand contract specified that payment shall be in
accordance with the official rate of exchange at the time
of payment is made.
We desire the payment clause of the contract should
remain unchange untile end of contract period providing
that the forcosted change of Yen and Dollar rate became
around five (5) percent or less.
If this change took place over ten (10) percent or over,
we shall be unable to perform smoothy delivery to the
Government
.
In view of the above situation, we appreciate if you would
issue us Yen Delivery order in lieu of Dollar or kind
















On 12 January 1971, I was awarded a contract to
wash military aircraft stationed at MCAS, Iwakuni.
My contract Number is N62649-71-D-0143 . After local
negotiations were completed, I commenced washing air-
craft on 1 February 1971. The cost of washing these
aircraft as submitted by me, in my contract bid, was
based on the International Exchange Rate of Y360 per
one (1) United States Dollar.
Approximately ninety (90) percent of my monetary
intake on this contract is expended in labor personnel
cost.
On 28 August 19 71, the Yen was allowed to Float on
the International Market and subsequently fell below
the previously established rate of Y360 per one (1)
United States Dollar. All of my expenses have remained
the same. During the month of August, 1971, my Washing
Service washed a total of $1264 worth of aircraft under
this contract. I am being paid at the yen rate as of
14 September 1971, due to a mix-up between the Station
Contracting Office and the Disbursing Office. This is
approximately six (6) percent below the previous rate
of payment.
My contract expires on 31 December 1971. During
this period of time, 1 September 1971 to 31 December
1971, I will lose a considerable amount of money if I
continue to provide this service daily and be paid at
the start of each month.
I would like to propose as a temporary change to
my contract whereby the United States Government absorb
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the new established rateof exchange and I will absorb




















Denki Kogyo Co., Ltd.
Contracting Officer
(62649) U.S. Naval Supply Depot
Yokosuka, Japan
Payment at the rate of 360 yen to 1 U.S.
request for
dollar;
(a) Contract No. N62649-71-C-0052, "Operate and
maintain the U.S. Naval Radio Station (T)
Yosami for one (1) year from 1 October 1970
through 30 September 1971 on a monthly pay-
ment basis : $24,440.00"
(b) Contract No. N62649-71-C-0052 , DD From 1665,
page 8 of 11, Section K-3.0 Payment which
reads as follows;
"K-3.0 Payment: Payment will be made monthly
by the Officer in Charge, U.S. Navy Finance
Office, Yokosuka Japan, in Japanese currency
at the official rate of exchange at the time
payment is made."
(c) Cost Breakdown for N62649-71-R-0014 dated 10
August 1970 attached to Contract Pricing Pro-
posal DD From 633 of solicitation, Offer, and
Award No. N62649-71-R-0014 . Remarks on the
Cost Breakdown read as follows:
Remarks
:
In the event that the official rate of exchange
from U.S. dollar into Japanese yen would be
changed, payment should be made in Japanese
currency at the official rate of exchange at
the time of contract.
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Appendix E - Cont'd.
1. Prior to contract of Ref (a), Ref (c) was discussed
between NSD representatives and Denki Kogyo represen-
tatives. Denki Kogyo requested that the payment con-
version clause should have been modified to read as "at
the time of contract" instead of "at the time of pay-
ment" from the fact that our proposal was made on the
basis of actual expenses for the past year and it did
not include any contingency fee for a possible revalu-
ation of yen and to avoid a burden resulting from the
revaluation if it occur. However NSD representatives
replied that they were not in a position to mention
the matter at that time. Denki Kogyo is well aware of
the tremendous importance of NRS (T) Yosami to the
United States commitment for the defense of the Western
Pacific, and we are also aware of our responsibilities
to the U.S. Navy to maintain and operate the Station.
We signed Ref (a) in the expectation that you would
make an equitable adjustment for us if the rate is
actually changed.
2. On 3 September 1971, we had it from a source that pay-
ment of Ref (a) for the month of August will be made
at a rate of floating exchange rates of a day previous
to the time of which payment is made. We were also
informed that the rate applied by U.S. Finance Office
here in Japan as of 2 September 1971 was 338.50 yen
to 1 U.S. dollar, approx. 6% loss with the official
rate of exchange, 360 yen to 1 U/S. dollar. Whereas
a legal official of a leading foreign exchange bank
says that the official rate of exchange between the
Japanese yen and U.S. dollar stipulated in Ref (b)
remains 360 yen to 1 dollar, and the recent action
taken by Japanese Government after U.S. President
Richard Nixon's announcement of the new U.S. economic
policy on 15 August 1971 to float the yen in its re-
lation to U.S. dollar only constitutes an abondonment
of the 0.75% of variency from the official rate which
is allowed by the IMF.
3. Be the matter what it may, the payment conversion rate
is of serious concern to us, the contractor to the
United States Government. Application of a floating
exchange rate or a possible revaluation of yen would
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4. In view of the foregoing, we sincerely wish to ask for
your consideration on the payment rate of 360 yen to
1 U.S. dollar for Ref (a) .
Your immediate reply on this matter will be highly appreci-
ated.




Copy to: Contract Administrator, U.S. NAVCOMMSTA, Japan
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